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Simon effectWe review studies suggesting time disorders on both automatic and subjective levels in patients with schizo-
phrenia. Patients have difﬁculty explicitly discriminating between simultaneous and asynchronous events, and
ordering events in time. We discuss the relationship between these difﬁculties and impairments on a more
elementary level. We showed that for undetectable stimulus onset asynchronies below 20 ms, neither patients
nor controls merge events in time, as previously believed. On the contrary, subjects implicitly distinguish be-
tween events even when evaluating them to be simultaneous. Furthermore, controls privilege the last stimulus,
whereas patients seem to stay stuck on the ﬁrst stimulus when asynchronies are sub-threshold. Combining pre-
vious results shows this to be true for patients even for asynchronies as short as 8 ms. Moreover, this peculiarity
predicts difﬁculties with detecting asynchronies longer than 50ms, suggesting an impact on the conscious ability
to time events. Difﬁculties on the subjective level are also correlatedwith clinical disorganization. The results are
interpretedwithin the framework of predictive codingwhich can account for an implicit ability to update events.
These results complement a range of other results, by suggesting a difﬁculty with binding information in time as
well as space, and by showing that information processing lacks continuity and stability in patients. The time
perspective may help bridge the gap between cognitive impairments and clinical symptoms, by showing how
the innermost structure of thought and experience is disrupted.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
We review here recent investigations regarding the visual percep-
tion of events in time in patients with schizophrenia. We examined
the coding of the succession of distinct events in time, i.e. the ability to
predict and follow the events ﬂow. This ability is an integral part of
our inner experience and our ability to interact with the outer world.
We argue that these abilities are rooted in elementary mechanisms
that allow us to distinguish and follow events in time on an unconscious
level (b20 ms), and which are impaired in patients with schizophrenia
(Lalanne et al., 2012a,b). Here we shall examine relationships between
such elementary mechanisms and conscious experience, based on
previous studies.eMédecine Translationnelle de
pital of Strasbourg, 1, Place de
. This is an open access article under1.1. Time and predictive coding
Coding events efﬁciently in time is necessary in order to be connected
with the outer world. It is necessary for encoding both predictable and
new events. Predictive coding provides a theoretical framework to
account for these abilities (Friston, 2008), by proposing that the brain
triggers expectations about future sensory inputs. These can then be
used to check whether actual sensory signals match expectations. If a
match is found, sensory signals can be suppressed, whereas sensory
information contrary to predictions will be relatively enhanced
(Garrido et al., 2009). Predictable events thus bring about a suppres-
sion of information, whereas new events are detected by means of
continuous updating of information. Here we focus on the regularity
of this updating in time, on both unconscious and conscious levels.
We also question how automatic updates are used and integrated into
conscious, subjective experiences. It is not straightforward that the
updating frequency is the same on automatic and subjective levels. In
everyday life, new events can be both numerous and close in time,
and the successive processing of events based on automatic updating
could bemisleading. For example, objects or peoplemove behind infor-
mation in the foreground or come out from side streets, windows arethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1 To facilitate replication studies, it should be emphasized that care must be taken to
achieve accurate time presentation on the screen. We only used CRT screens (120 Hz to
achieve presentations lasting 8.3 ms; otherwise, the usual 60 Hz screen allows for 17 ms
presentations). In the ﬁrst studies we used a dedicated ViSaGe stimuli generator
(Cambridge Research System) with a 50 Hz video eyetracker to control time accuracy
and check that subjects were focusing on the center of the screen. More recent studies
were programmed on dedicated (not connected to internet) computers with Matlab
(no-java) and Psychtoolbox. All these softwares include programming routines designed
to avoid interference during stimuli presentations, i.e., to devote CPU time to the program,
even in a Windows environment. Timing accuracy was checked with photo cells. This
should be done systematically.
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sive, without, however, necessarily being logically related in time. A
light might be switched on between successive appearances of the
same moving object. If subjective perception were directly impacted
by temporal updating mechanisms, the light would interrupt percep-
tion of the moving object, but this is not what happens. Furthermore,
experimental evidence shows that our sensory system is not sensitive
enough to capture the location of the moving object at exactly the
same time as the light, resulting in the ﬂash-lag effect, where the
moving objet is perceived ahead of time in relation to the light (reviews
in Hubbard, 2014; Shimojo, 2014). This suggests that the updating of
information may not be totally accurate in time, and that additional
processing affects our subjective perception. It thus raises questions
about the relationship between the updating of information on an
elementary and subjective levels. This is of particular relevance
with respect to patients with schizophrenia, insofar as it has been
proposed that they suffer from predictive coding impairments
(Fogelson et al., 2014; Ford et al., 2014; NotreDame et al., 2014). It
is true that they display connectivity disorders (Friston, 1996;
Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010), which might account for disturbances
in recurrent loops subtending the constant updating of information
processing and the detection of prediction errors (Fogelson et al.,
2014). Patients with schizophrenia display a disturbed ability to de-
tect deviants, e.g. a new and unexpected stimulus, and the amplitude
of the EEG response to deviants is reduced (Umbricht and Krljes,
2005, for a review see Nagai et al., 2013). This would induce difﬁcul-
ties distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant information, and
would cause patients to assign the wrong salience to events (Kapur,
2003; Nelson et al., 2013), possibly resulting in delusional beliefs
(Schmack et al., 2013).
These difﬁculties may be explained in the context of predictive
coding (Garrido et al., 2009). Several studies have suggested that
some prediction aspects are impaired in patients (Ford et al.,
2014; Franck et al., 2001; Frith, 2005; Neuhaus et al., 2013). How-
ever, the temporal dimension of this prediction has not been ex-
plored in patients (but see Schwartze et al., 2011 for evidence in
healthy volunteers).
Since predictive coding is based on the continuous updating of infor-
mation, any disturbance in how information is updated in time should
impact predictive coding. Our results suggest not only that the frequency
of updating is higher than previously believed in both controls and
patients with schizophrenia, but also that the updating mechanisms
are qualitatively impaired in patients.
2. Time events structure coding and schizophrenia
Distinguishing between two events in time requires that each event
be considered to be ‘new’. If the second event is not detected as being
new, it is either ignored or merged in time with the ﬁrst, with the two
events considered to be simultaneous. In the context of predictive
coding, this means that an information update is needed to distinguish
between events in time. Conversely, it means that our ability to
distinguish between events in time might index the frequency of the
updating mechanisms.
Many studies revealed a lower margin in our ability to distinguish
subjectively between events in time, estimated at between 30 and
50 ms, irrespective of the sensory source. These results produced the
concept of windows of time, or perceptual moments, within which all
events are processed simultaneously (reviewed in Elliott et al., 2006,
2007; van Wassenhove, 2009; Wittmann, 2011). In the context of
predictive coding, this means that information processing is updated
every 50 ms. Interestingly, this time window is longer in patients,
which suggests that updating is slower in patients with schizophrenia
(Foucher et al., 2007; Giersch et al., 2009; Lalanne et al., 2012a; Schmidt
et al., 2011). The time window is assessed using a simple paradigm
involving two visual stimuli (e.g. two squares) shown on a computerscreen1. They appear simultaneously or with a short stimulus onset
asynchrony (usually between 0 and 100 ms) and participants judge
whether the two stimuli are simultaneous or asynchronous. They
respond by pressing a left response key for simultaneity and a right
response key for asynchrony. Patients systematically require greater
asynchronies than healthy participants before reporting that two
stimuli are separated in time (Foucher et al., 2007; Giersch et al., 2009;
Lalanne et al., 2012a; Schmidt et al., 2011). They have evenmore difﬁculty
when they have to code the temporal order of the stimuli (Capa et al.,
2014). Temporal order judgments were explored using exactly the
same protocol as for asynchrony detection, but participants had to
press the key on the same side of the second stimulus instead of de-
ciding whether the stimuli are simultaneous or asynchronous. Con-
trol experiments have enabled us to rule out possible confounding
factors like bias effects, eye movements, inter-hemispheric transfer
or subjective judgments (review in Giersch et al., 2013).
However, our recent results challenge the assumption that all events
are merged in time within 50 ms elementary time windows. They
suggest, on the contrary, that events can be processed automatically
as separate in time in the case of short delays of less than 20 ms,
i.e. even when they are subjectively judged as being simultaneous. In
the context of predictive coding, this suggests that updating mecha-
nisms have a higher temporal resolution on the automatic level than
on the subjective level. Below, we review evidence of such automatic
mechanisms and their distortion in patients with schizophrenia.3. Automatic updating of information within temporal windows
The exploration of implicit timingmechanismswasmotivated by the
mismatch between the mild clinical state of the patients involved, and
their considerable impairments as regards subjectively distinguishing
events in time. In some studies (with distractors, Giersch et al, 2009, or
with multisensory information, Martin et al, 2013) patients with schizo-
phrenia needed asynchronies of more than 100 to 200 ms to detect the
stimuli were not simultaneous. We reasoned that if this were true in
everyday life, it would causemajor difﬁculties, whichwas not consistent
with the mild clinical state of our outpatients. In our experiments, the
instructions given included a direct, explicit question about the presence
or absence of asynchrony. We wondered whether automatic processing
in patients wasmore accurate than explicit responses suggested (Del Cul
et al., 2006) and consequently used the Simon effect to investigate
patients’ ability to code events in time independently of an explicit
response. The Simon effect refers to the fact that responses are faster
and more accurate when a visual stimulus is presented within the
same perceptual hemiﬁeld as the responding hand (Hommel, 2011a,b;
van der Lubbe and Abrahamse, 2011). This effect was used to measure
the implicit processing of events in time while avoiding the need for
explicit instructions. As described above, two stimuli were displayed on
the screen, one to the left and one to the right, and participants
responded (‘simultaneity’ or ‘asynchrony’) by pressing the left or right
response key, respectively. When both stimuli are displayed simulta-
neously, a Simon effect cannot occur, because the information displayed
is equivalent on both sides of the screen, and participants cannot be
biased to respond on any one side. Asymmetry only occurs when the
stimuli are asynchronous, and in these conditions a Simon effect was
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answer on the side of the second stimulus, independently of whether it
was on the left or right. This means that responses differed according
to the stimulus order. They were more frequent on the right when the
second stimulus was on the right-hand side of the screen, and more
frequent on the left when the second stimulus was on the left. Since
physical information is identical on both sides, it is the temporal
asynchrony that can be seen as responsible for the Simon effect. Impor-
tantly, the Simon effect was observed with short asynchronies
(b20 ms), even when the mean rate of ‘simultaneous’ responses was
similar to the rate observed with perfect synchrony, i.e. when no
asynchronies were detected (Lalanne et al., 2012b). It is when
asynchronies are not detected that observation of a Simon effect pro-
vides an indication about the implicit processing of stimuli in time.
When asynchronies cannot be detected, the stimuli are perceived subjec-
tively in the sameway as with perfect simultaneity. If this were also true
on an automatic level, there should be no Simon effect. On the contrary,
the fact that responses differ according to the stimulus order shows that
part of the asynchrony has been processed implicitly, even though it was
not captured by subjective judgments. Hence, the Simon effect observed
with such asynchronies can be regarded as unconscious, and this effect
might be interpreted as reﬂecting the updating of information on an
automatic level. When subjects process a ﬁrst stimulus, they are already
prepared to process a following stimulus, and the results suggest that
this update can occur unbeknown to the subject, in the case of delays
lasting less than 20 ms.
Interestingly, Simon effects were also observed in patients with
schizophrenia. For asynchronies above the threshold patients were
biased towards the side of the second stimulus like healthy participants
(Lalanne et al., 2012a). This contrasted with the results observed with
the shortest asynchronies (below 20 ms), where patients were biased
towards the side of the ﬁrst stimulus, rather than the second. Like
with the healthy controls, responses were more frequent on the left
when the ﬁrst stimulus was on the left, and on the right when the ﬁrst
stimulus was on the right, even when the asynchrony between the
stimuli was not detected. This shows that part of the asynchrony has
been automatically processed. We made sure patients did not display
a general bias towards either the left or right (i.e. simultaneous or
asynchronous), but in any case, such a spatial bias would not have
yielded a bias depending on the stimulus order. In all the crucial result
of our studieswas that response rates depended on the stimulus tempo-
ral order, even for undetectable asynchronies (Lalanne et al, 2012b). The
results show that patients distinguish between events in time on an im-
plicit level. However, although patients did not merge events in time,
the Simon effect was still on the opposite side in relation to controls,
showing a qualitative difference in information processing with short
asynchronies. Controls were biased towards answering on the side of
the second stimulus, whereas patients were biased towards the side of
the ﬁrst stimulus. These results can be seen as evidence of impaired in-
formation updating in patients, who process stimuli in a discontinuous
manner. Controls automatically follow events in time, and the high res-
olution of automatic updating mechanisms results not only in the pro-
cessing of the ﬁrst stimulus when it is isolated on the screen, but also
in the ability to expect and subsequently process the second stimulus
(Lalanne et al., 2012a,b). Patients, on the other hand, remain stuck onTable 1
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients included in the reviewed studies.
Sex ratio (M/F) Years of educat
Group 1 (Lalanne et al., 2012a, 2012b) N = 30 Mean 18/12 12.0
SD 1.9
Group 2 N = 28 Mean 20/8 12.9
SD 2.3the ﬁrst event, i.e. at the updating stage. As such, these results would
be consistent with disrupted predictive coding. At this stage, however,
it is still unclear how these impairments relate to difﬁculties on a subjec-
tive level. This step is crucial for understanding the consequences of the
impairments observed on a clinical level, and an attempt is made below
to ﬁll this gap in our knowledge.
4. Relationship between implicit and explicit coding in time
Results observed so far suggest a dissociation between patients’
implicit and explicit responses, since the Simon effect is on the side of
the ﬁrst stimulus in the case of short, undetected asynchronies, but on
the side of the second stimuluswhen asynchronies are longer. Similarly,
implicit and explicit responses have been shown to be dissociatedwhen
usingmultisensory stimuli (Martin et al., 2013). This raises the question
of the relationship between impairments observed on an implicit and
explicit level.
We combined two studies conducted and analyzed separately
(Lalanne et al., 2012a and Experiment 1 in Lalanne et al., 2012b;method
details can be found in these two papers). The demographic and clinical
characteristics are detailed in Table 1 (Group 1).
In both studies, two squares were displayed in two of four possible
locations, at one of the four corners of a virtual square in the middle of
the screen. The only difference between the two experiments was the
presence of connecters between squares in Lalanne et al. (2012b) (Fig. 1).
Performance did not differ signiﬁcantly between experiments,
whichmeant that we were able to combine the results together despite
this difference. Most importantly, these were the two experiments in
which we used SOAs of 8 ms only. We focus on this SOA since it is
way below the threshold of subjective asynchrony detection and
deﬁnitely unconscious. Since our aim was to explore the relationship
between implicit and subjective asynchrony detection, we considered
the conditions which had led to a Simon effect, i.e. to a difference in
the rate of ‘simultaneous’ response as a function of the target order
(targets located to the left and right of the middle of the screen in
Lalanne et al., 2012a, and connected targets in the same locations in
Lalanne et al., 2012b).
We conducted an ANOVA on the amplitude of the Simon effect at
8 ms, with group (patients vs. controls) and experiment as between-
group factors. The Simon effect at 8 ms differed signiﬁcantly between
groups (F[1, 56] = 4.9, p b .05, η2 = 0.08), η2 = 0.1). There was no
bias in controls (F b 1). In contrast, patients showed a signiﬁcant bias
to press to the side of the ﬁrst square at 8 ms (9% more responses on
the left side for left–right vs. right–left squares, F[1, 28] = 8.5, p b .01,
η2 = 0.23, Fig. 2). This reﬂects a difference in the rate of ‘simultaneous’
responses according to stimulus order. It can equally be expressed as a
decrease of the rate of ‘simultaneous’ responses in the right–left vs.
left–right order. In fact, the comparison of response rates at 0 and
8 ms SOA in patients shows that in the right–left order, the rate of
‘asynchronous’ responses signiﬁcantly increases at 8 relative to 0 ms
(by 7%, F[1, 28] = 6.5, p b .05, η2 = 0.19).
The results therefore show that patients distinguish stimuli in time
with surprising accuracy, at least on an implicit level. This is all the
more surprising because they need larger asynchronies than controls
in order to detect them explicitly. The questionwaswhether the implicitPANSS
ion Age Total Positive Negative Global Disease duration
(years)
Chlorpromazine
equivalent
36.0 68.0 15.3 20.2 32.4 12.0 317.5
6.4 16.8 3.7 6.6 9.4 10.3 285.1
36.2 73.5 17.0 20.1 36.3 13.2 234.3
9.1 20.7 5.6 7.2 11.1 7.8 150.3
Fig. 1. Illustration of the procedure designed to explore simultaneity/asynchrony discrimination. Two squares are ﬁlled in, in gray, either simultaneously or asynchronously. These two
squares were unconnected in Lalanne et al (2012a) (a), whereas half of them were connected in Lalanne et al. (2012b) (b). Participants are instructed to respond with the right key
when they think that the squares are ﬁlled in asynchronously and the left key when they think that ﬁlling-in occurs simultaneously.
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difﬁculty detecting larger asynchronies on a subjective level. Correla-
tions conducted on the above results suggest the opposite. In patients,
the Simon effect was positively correlated with the rate of ‘simulta-
neous’ responses at SOAs above 50ms (Table 2). The greater the tenden-
cy to press on the side of the ﬁrst stimulus, the greater the difﬁculties
detecting asynchronies on a subjective level. This correlation is not
trivial, since at 8 ms the Simon effect reﬂects high temporal accuracy
on an implicit level, whereas performance above threshold reﬂects the
opposite on an explicit level. However, the correlation is consistent
with our interpretation of the Simon effect in patients as reﬂecting a
difﬁculty with implicitly following/predicting stimuli in time. TheFig. 2. Amplitude of the bias (in %) to the side of the 1st or 2nd stimulus, when one stim-
ulus is displayed on the right sideof the screen and the other one on the left. A positive bias
corresponds to a bias to the side of the ﬁrst stimulus (in patients), whereas a negative bias
corresponds to a bias to the side of the second stimulus (in healthy participants). See
Lalanne et al. (2012a) and (2012b), for more detailed results.correlation further suggests a link between this implicit effect and the
difﬁculty observed on a subjective level. The difﬁculty automatically
following/predicting stimuli might play a causal role in the impair-
ments in respect of distinguishing stimuli in time on a subjective
level. No correlation was found with clinical symptoms.
We checked correlations in more recent data collected in a group of
28 patients. In this study we used a single paradigm instead of two
different experiments (for demographic details, see Table 1, Group 2).
Using the same experiment for all patients was expected tomake corre-
lations between performance and clinical symptomsmore reliable. Only
two locations were used for the targets, without any connecter. The
minimal SOA was too long (24 ms) to examine the Simon effect as
above. Hence we only correlated the ‘simultaneous’ response rate at
the different SOA with clinical evaluations. We found that in patients
the simultaneous response rates near threshold and above were
signiﬁcantly correlated with disorganization, as evaluated with item
P2 of the PANSS (thought disorganization), andwith the Lepine disorga-
nization score (sum of items P2, N5, G10 and G11 in the PANSS, van
Assche and Giersch, 2011; Table 3). The worse the ability to detect asyn-
chronous events in time, the worse the disorganization. We found no
other signiﬁcant correlation with clinical symptoms. This effect is
reminiscent of a correlation observed previously in a smaller group
of patients (N = 20), when exploring temporal order judgment
(Capa et al., 2014). In this study, there had been an (unpublished)
correlation with the error rate for discriminating temporal order
and item P2 (R = 0.65, p b .005 for the 48 ms SOA, and R = 0.54,
p b 0.5 for the 72 ms SOA). These results are in keeping with the corre-
lation found between perceptual and conceptual (clinical) disorganiza-
tion (Silverstein and Keane, 2011; Uhlhaas and Silverstein, 2005; vanTable 2
correlations between the Simon effect at 8 ms and the rate of simultaneous responses, in
the data issued from Lalanne et al. (2012a) and (2012b).
30 patients with schizophrenia R p
Simon effect at 8 ms Rate of ‘simultaneous’ response with:
SOA 64 ms 0.41 0.025
SOA 72 ms 0.40 0.028
SOA 83 ms 0.55 0.002
SOA 92 ms 0.46 0.011
Table 3
Correlations between clinical scores and the rate of simultaneous responses.
28 patients with schizophrenia R p
Disorganization score of Lepine
P2/N5/G10/G11
Rate of ‘simultaneous’ response with:
SOA 48 ms 0.48 0.010
SOA 72 ms 0.47 0.011
SOA 96 ms 0.40 0.033
Threshold 0.50 0.007
Thought disorganization P2 Rate of ‘simultaneous’ response with:
SOA 48 ms 0.52 0.004
SOA 72 ms 0.47 0.011
SOA 96 ms 0.60 0.001
Threshold 0.56 0.002
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and thus to go from one stimulus to another in time relates with amore
general coordination failure.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Our results have shown that patients have difﬁculty distinguishing
events in time on a subjective level, especially when they are asked to
put events in order. On an implicit level, however, both controls and
patients with schizophrenia have been shown to distinguish events in
time automatically. Yet, patients still differ from controls on this implicit
level. Controls are able to follow events automatically on an implicit
level, whereas patients are stuck on the ﬁrst event, without being able
to go smoothly from the ﬁrst to the second. In addition, we showed
this to be true for asynchronies as short as 8ms. At 8ms the Simon effect
was correlated with difﬁculties detecting asynchronies on a subjective
level (Group 1), the latter being correlated with clinical disorganization
(Group 2). The fact that in patients there is no merging in time at 8 ms
shows that the updating mechanisms are sufﬁciently preserved for
patients to catch 8 ms events. This is consistent with previous data
(Herzog et al., 2004). However, unlike controls, patients do not process
the second event, as if their ability to predict/follow the next event is
disturbed when it is close in time. This might be related to other distur-
bances described in patients. For example, processing of the ﬁrst event
might not be stabilized fast enough for patients to follow information
when the next event is close in time (Herzog et al., 2013). Similarly,
this difﬁculty might have to do with deﬁcient phasic responses of the
magnocellular system (Dias et al., 2011; Knebel et al., 2011), although
this would not explain why difﬁculties with explicitly detecting asyn-
chronies are related to the Simon effect at 8 ms, or why patients’ ability
to judge the order between stimuli more distant in time is impaired
(Capa et al., 2014). This relationship between the updatingmechanisms
on an automatic and subjective level is consistent with our earlier pro-
posal, according to which the Simon effect captures a core mechanism
allowing us to relate events in time. This may involve speciﬁc neurobio-
logical networks. In the context of an impairment in the cortico-
cerebellar-thalamic-cortical circuit (Andreasen, 1999), high resolution
systems like the cerebellum (Coull et al., 2011; Schwartze and Kotz,
2013) would be preserved, inasmuch as patients still distinguish infor-
mation automatically in time when asynchronies are short. On the
other hand, the integration of successive events enabling them to be
linked would reﬂect abnormal integration of information beyond
systems like the cerebellum.
If patients are unable to follow events on an unconscious level, the
continuity of their perception, and ensuing train of thought would be
disrupted. In turn, it would make it difﬁcult to order events on a subjec-
tive level, especially as time order needs to be integrated with spatial
organization. Accordingly, time disorders would complement the disor-
ganization in space (Silverstein and Keane, 2011; Tschacher et al.,
2006). Moreover, we have proposed that disorganization in time
might impact patients’ ability to experience themselves as a continuous
self (Martin et al., 2014). This hypothesis refers to the concept ofminimal self, i.e. the fact that any perception, thought, or action is tacitly
experienced in ﬁrst-person mode. For example, when we say ‘I see the
tree’, we are usually talking about the tree, without reﬂecting on the
use of ‘I’. This non-reﬂexive use of ‘I’ illustrates the implicit (but not
unconscious) presence of oneself in our mental activities. Cermolacce
et al. (2007) and Sass and Parnas (2003) have described minimal self
disorders in patients with schizophrenia and have observed that their
experiences (thoughts, actions, perceptions) are not ‘given’ to them in
a ﬁrst-person perspective. Inasmuch as the minimal self is deﬁned, or
at least inﬂuenced, by our conscious perceptual experiences (see
Mishara, 2007, for background theory on this point), it follows that
disruptions in perceptions may affect the minimal self, i.e. the feeling
of being here and now. Indeed, if patients are unable to follow events
in time efﬁciently, and are thus not attuned to the outer world, it
might be difﬁcult for them to feel they are present here and now.
Furthermore, we can hypothesize that temporal disruptions reveal
discontinuities in patients’ inner thoughts (Northoff, 2015), in which
case the fragmentation of their mental experience might directly affect
their feeling of being one continuous self. These timedisordersmay thus
constitute a key link between elementary and clinical disorders, and
may provide an explanation for self-descriptions like the following
(Fuchs, 2013):
“Time is also running strangely. It falls apart and no longer pro-
gresses. There arise only innumerable separate now, now, now …
quite crazy and without rules or order. It is the same with myself.
From moment to moment, various ‘selves’ arise and disappear
entirely at random. There is no connection between my present
ego and the one before”.Acknowledgements
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